Following the assassination of General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, in an Israeli airstrike in June 2025, the Leader of the Islamic Republic immediately replaced him by promoting Major General Abdolrahim Mousavi to the post. Former Army Commander-in-Chief Mousavi became the first regular army officer in the history of the Islamic Republic to be appointed to a position previously held only by the commander of the Revolutionary Guards.
This transition took place amid a full-blown war between Iran and Israel. Israel conducted sweeping aerial and drone attacks targeting Iran’s military and nuclear sites, and Iran struck back, firing hundreds of ballistic missiles and drones into Israel. Within a day or two, the United States had joined the fight, hitting high-value Iranian sites like Natanz, Fordow, and a technology center in Isfahan, taking the war to the next level, which Iran responded by firing ballistic missiles at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar — one of the most significant installations in the region.
Finally, the US government, led by President Donald Trump, could negotiate a formal peace treaty today that will finally end more than a week of brutal fighting between Iran and Israel.
Military Implications and the Army–IRGC Power Balance
The appointment of Mousavi signals a shift in the traditional balance of power between the Army and the IRGC. While Bagheri and previous chiefs emerged from within the IRGC and acted as coordinators between the two forces, this is the first time a regular army officer has been placed at the top of the armed forces hierarchy. The move likely aimed to promote greater cohesion between the two military branches.
In the early stages of the war, Israel’s lightning strikes wiped away most of Iran’s senior military leaders. Those killed in the first tens of hours included the IRGC’s Commander-in-Chief and its Head of the Aerospace Force. This created a leadership vacuum within the structures of the Iranian military. In this context, Mousavi’s appointment as a loyal and seasoned army commander was a step toward rapidly restoring the chain of command and managing the crisis.
Simultaneously, the IRGC’s Ground Forces Commander was promoted to head the entire IRGC and other key leadership posts were filled. The Army successfully took over the essential leadership of the effort. It linked action among the services for the first time.
Operationally, this moves improved ground collaboration between the Army and the IRGC. In the Cho war, both sides conducted overall offensive and defensive operations. The Army’s air defense units countered waves of aerial and missile attacks. In contrast, IRGC missile units launched hundreds of ballistic and cruise missiles at Israeli targets.
Though parts of Iran’s air defense and missile infrastructure were damaged in the initial strikes, the armed forces managed to implement much of their rapid-response strategy. Within the first few nights, major Israeli cities like Tel Aviv and Haifa came under intense missile fire. The new generation of Iran’s advanced missiles showed that, even with the loss of leaders, the military’s command-and-control structure was operating effectively.
Mousavi’s job at that time was to coordinate the activities of the Army and IRGC so that the lack of the lost IRGC commanders would be addressed as soon as possible. Observers believe his appointment was a calculated move by the regime to compensate for the IRGC’s weakened leadership and retain control over wartime decision-making. Without unified command, the simultaneous loss of top IRGC leaders might have led to confusion or internal rivalry—but placing a trusted army officer at the helm enabled a cohesive military response.
It is difficult to predict the implications of this leadership transition for the mid-term. On the one hand, the Army’s rise and the temporary setback of the IRGC might trigger soft competition. The more traditional/nationalistic-oriented Army is concerned with territorial defense. By comparison, the IRGC is involved in ideological and regional missions.
On the other hand, the IRGC’s failure to prevent Israeli penetration and the deaths of its commanders may fuel internal criticism. Meanwhile, the Army—viewed as a more professional and less politicized institution—could gain greater credibility among the public and within segments of the ruling establishment.
Some have also speculated that this transfer of responsibility could facilitate greater rationalization between the command structures of the Army and the IRGC, which has often been accused of promoting redundant command architecture at the cost of operational effectiveness. Such reforms, however, will be in the hands of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and will largely depend on the future security environment of the state.
All the same, the latest crisis has put before the parties a unique opportunity for combined Army-IRGC cooperation on the battlefield. This nightmare may change our views of Iranian military capabilities, their constraints, and the future security architecture of that country.
Domestic Political Messages
Apart from its military aspects, the recent events bore major political implications inside Iran. The large-scale war with Israel—conducted inside Iranian territory—marked the most severe national security crisis since the Iran–Iraq War. The high death toll, destruction across provinces from the border regions to the capital, and the deaths of top IRGC commanders delivered a devastating blow to the regime’s structure. It plunged the country into an unprecedented state of emergency.
In such a context, appointing an army general to replace a slain IRGC commander sent a clear political message. The Supreme Leader demonstrated that national security and organizational order take precedence over factional or institutional loyalties in times of crisis. This decision could also indicate a transient loss of confidence in the organization of the IRGC and the Army, which is used as a dependable agency to protect the nation.
While this shift may be temporary, it has empowered the Army relative to the IRGC, at least in the near term. Most analysts see this as a signal to the IRGC to concentrate on its military responsibilities and stop getting overly involved in politics or the economy. The IRGC’s role was much smaller by comparison; the government and the Army took over most of the crisis management work during the war.
From a social perspective, public response was divided. At first, nationalist sentiment prevailed, and even critics of the regime denounced the Israeli attacks. However, as the days passed, new questions about the effectiveness of the country’s defense establishment and intelligence agencies began. In the first days of the war, the mass arrests of social media users and the quashing of protests indicated that the regime sought to clamp down on public discourse.
With the war fever gone, the regime had to face basic questions: How could the enemy have penetrated so far into Iran? How is it that the security and defense systems are taken off guard? And is it reasonable to continue nuclear and regional policies at the cost of domestic security? Rumors even circulated about the evacuation of officials’ families during the war—though unconfirmed, these rumors only deepened public distrust.
Meanwhile, US President Trump’s remarks on the ceasefire—emphasizing the need for Iran to reach a swift agreement—elicited diverse reactions within Iran. Some saw it as a signal that the United States was ready to negotiate. While some viewed it as a fair proposal, others perceived it as a degrading ultimatum. The establishment itself fractured between pragmatists seeking de-escalation to save the system and hardliners who saw retreat as an announcement of weakness and abject peril.
In the end, the war was a harsh lesson for the Islamic Republic. It shook the regime’s power structure and disrupted public perceptions. If the regime intends to survive, it must reform its behavior and reconsider key domestic and foreign policies, even if preserving the core power structure remains its top priority.
The Status of the Resistance Axis
In the run-up to Iran’s war with Israel, the world anticipated that Iran’s regional proxies and allied militias in the battlefields across the region—collectively known as the “Axis of Resistance”—would rush to Tehran’s defense. This Axis includes groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Shiite militias in Iraq, and Palestinian factions like Hamas and Islamic Jihad. But contrary to first appearances, these actors were , in effect, sooner or later, very restricted – if not simply symbolic – actors who hardly squared up to Israel. Hezbollah, the most potent military proxy of Iran in the region, issued statements of support and delivered menacing rhetoric. Still, it refrained from taking any military action. Although some Hezbollah units were activated and there was increased border activity in Lebanon, no major action was taken. Iran-aligned militias in Iraq, initially silent after the killing, failed to repeat at least the sporadic rocket attacks that had been launched at US bases regularly leading up to the Jan. 3 strike in Baghdad. The Houthis in Yemen, who had spent the previous two weeks targeting Saudi and Emirati positions, stayed inactive. There were a few rockets launched from Gaza by smaller groups, but Hamas and Islamic Jihad, despite their long history of hostility to Israel, made a point of not opening a second front. This was especially important as, unlike the global rivalry between the USA and the USSR, Iran–Israel was taking place on the soil of the rival nations, and regional escalation might turn into a regional war.
There were various reasons behind this strategic moderation. Economic collapse and the absence of a popular base for a new war on Lebanon tied the hands of Hezbollah. In Iraq, no major Shiite groups entered the fray, partly because of post-ISIS political rivalries and pressure from the public. In Palestine, resistance factions were recovering from recent battles with Israel and lacked logistical readiness for another conflict.
At the same time, this non-intervention can be seen as a form of strategic realism by the Resistance Axis. Both groups probably came to the calculation that they couldn’t support Iran directly without potentially losing some of their power base and being subjected to greater retaliation. Iran appeared to want a limited crisis as well, rather than a wider regional war.
However, the absence of involvement of the Resistance Axis cast doubts on this alliance’s coordination, mutual dedication, and readiness for functioning. This was the first time that Iran was left alone battling an open war with Israel, and it might lead Tehran to rethink its regional deterrence doctrine. In the future, Iran may strengthen its coordination and command within the Axis of the Resistance so that the response to a similar attack is much more coherent.
These blocks will invest more in their military abilities, particularly long-range missile systems, drones, and air defenses. This also proved that rhetorical threats and claims of readiness are not enough. If the Resistance Axis wants to become a regional geopolitical player – or do more than just make fiery speeches – it must rebuild its military capabilities and responsive capacity.
In summary, the performance of the Resistance Axis during the recent conflict was a blend of tactical restraint and structural limitations. While it prevented an even wider escalation, it revealed a glaring vulnerability — there was no unity, no collective response. If it wants to remain central, the Islamic Republic of Iran should work on rekindling its military-security ties with regional allies.
War Scenarios and the Possibility of Regime Collapse if the US Had Intervened
One of the most critical concerns during the recent crisis was the possibility of direct US military intervention and its consequences for the survival of the Islamic Republic. Israel initiated the attacks with the apparent hope of provoking Iran into a response that would draw the United States into the conflict. The Israeli Prime Minister explicitly said that the downfall of the Iranian regime was within reach and that the confrontation could lead to a domestic revolt in Iran. Although Israel publicly cited its need to confront Iran’s nuclear threat, the language of some Israeli officials suggested a more overarching goal of regime change in Tehran.
However, most military analysts agreed that Israel alone could not topple the Iranian government. Iran has a population nearing 90 million. History has shown, in cases like Afghanistan and Iraq, that even far weaker regimes required full-scale U.S. ground invasions and prolonged occupations to be overthrown. So, even if Israel had exhausted its entire arsenal, it is doubtful it would have led to the collapse of the Iranian regime without U.S. involvement.
The nightmare scenario in Tehran was a large-scale U.S. intervention. This fear was heightened by repeated warnings from American officials and the psychological pressure of an escalating war. Initially, Washington attempted to remain on the sidelines—providing only intelligence support, reinforcing Israeli air defenses, and keeping military assets in the region on standby to maintain what one official described as a strategy of “controlled escalation.”
That changed when Iran launched a missile attack on Al Udeid Air Base, a major U.S. military hub in Qatar. That strike effectively drew the United States into direct involvement in the conflict. It was an instant that placed the White House at an enormous crossroads — whether to enter a full-blown war or seek out some immediate de-escalation. In the end, the United States chose a hybrid path: eschewing a declaration of war, it conducted one of the most destructive military raids in recent memory. US President Donald Trump announced on Jun. 22, 2025 that the American forces had begun an “Operation Midnight Hammer” striking at the heart of Iran’s nuclear installations. The action included the use of more than a dozen 30,000-pound GBU-57A/B MOP bunker-buster bombs deployed via stealthy radar-evading B-2 Spirit bombers and Tomahawk missiles launched from submarines in the region, Trump’s description on Truth Social says. The sites targeted were Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities in Fordow and Natanz and also an unmentioned location in Isfahan – three main pillars of the country’s nuclear program. Calling the operation “highly successful,” Trump said that it had dealt a severe blow to Iran’s nuclear capabilities. Republican lawmakers praised the decision as a sign of American determination. But even as they applauded the killing, many Democrats and even some Republicans voiced skepticism about the legality of the action, taken without the signoff of Congress. They raised concerns about its larger regional implications. The international response was mixed. Some countries regarded the operation as a necessary roll of the dice to stop Iran’s nuclear plans. Others, however, condemned it as a violation of international law that increased the risk of the conflict spinning out of control. The strike sent a clear message that the United States could alter the balance of power in the region without sending ground troops by using high-precision, limited-force projection.
This choice is best understood by using strategic realism as a lens. There can be little question that a full-blown US war might have devastated much of Iran’s vital infrastructure in short order, perhaps even including its command centers in downtown Tehran. However, past experiences—from Afghanistan to Iraq—demonstrate that physical destruction or the elimination of senior leaders does not necessarily lead to the collapse of ideologically entrenched regimes.
The Islamic Republic, with its integrated security system, control of media, and propaganda machine, can still repress rebellion under constant heavy bombing. A drawn-out war may have resulted in the humanitarian misery and bankruptcy of the war, but probably not the regime’s fall. It would invite social fragmentation, increased separatist fervor, and even civil war — instability that threaten to spread throughout the region. In that case, the US could have come under pressure to occupy some of Iran, a military action with huge human and financial costs and no obvious chance of success.
A ceasefire was, therefore, a rational choice for containment — for not provoking a crisis that climate change would drive toward military disaster. From American and Israeli points of view, the single most important goal — defanging Iran’s missile and nuclear capabilities — had been largely accomplished. The Islamic Republic held on to its basic structure and portrayed the ceasefire as evidence of its “resistance and deterrence.”
Nonetheless, the danger of regime collapse—had the US escalated further—was real. Reports even emerged that some senior officials close to the Supreme Leader were preparing for emergency evacuation during the war’s most chaotic days.
Hundreds of casualties, extensive infrastructure damage, weakened international stature, and, most importantly, a debased image of deterrence hurt the regime dearly. “The future of the Islamic Republic depends on whether it will draw any lessons from this tragedy, de-escalate tensions, adjust its regional strategies, and engage the world powers with more caution, or whether it insists too long on the path of confrontation, a course whereby no return will be even harder than before,” wrote Abbasi in the Kayhan daily.
The Role of Global Powers
The recent conflict (or near conflict) between Iran and Israel, apart from its regional/war side, provided a dynamic theater for the reactions and reach of global actors, not necessarily involved in the field but very instrumental in managing it, driving it, or even cousin on it. For all its bluster at the outset, the US followed a multi-layered and strategic course. On the other, Washington has bolstered Israel with intelligence and air-defense systems and put its regional forces on high alert, a clear warning to Tehran. At the same time, it was US policy not to become engaged directly in a protracted fight. The series of steps that led to the de-escalation, however, showed that the overriding concern of the United States was that it not become ensnared in a broader conflict in the Middle East, that it musters its allies in the region, and that it not be drawn into yet another big, costly war in a region that President Trump has pledged to leave. This approach allowed the US to blare the casing of crisis management while insinuating that diplomacy was like the base of the options pyramid it had when it was under a hardline administration. Read: China’s plan to rule the seas is submerged by the U.S.-China trade war. Another major global power, China, was more cautious. It urged all parties to exercise restraint and resolve differences through dialogue. Particularly in Beijing, they were concerned about higher energy prices and supply chain disruptions — it’s one of the biggest oil importers from the region. For its part, China sought to play a neutral mediator through its diplomats as part of the country’s broader strategic goal of getting a foot at least partly in the door in maintaining global security and governance over the US. While the US prefers to be more directly involved in regional security (rather than downplaying it, like China), China prefers to operate more from the wings and focus on economic diplomacy. Russia, in contrast, looked at the crisis through its special lens and saw only identical threats and opportunities. On paper, the Russians made pleas for de-escalation and issued statements calling for calm. But quietly, it used Iran’s standoff with the West to solidify its strategic relations with Tehran. Waging its war in Ukraine and under heavy Western sanctions, Russia viewed support for Iran as a way to preserve a key regional ally. Nevertheless, Moscow’s rather low-keyed involvement in the crisis demonstrated its constrained ability or willingness to get deeply involved in another war in the Middle East, with a clear preference for a stability policy in the region.
The European Union, on the other hand, showed a largely passive, limited response. Most European governments limited themselves to diplomatic statements of concern over the escalation. Some countries, like France and Germany, attempted to communicate with both parties and mediate. Yet, on the whole, the EU was ill-armed and fragmented politically to decisively shape the crisis. And as the European Union has increasingly turned to non-Iranian sources of energy to deal with internal issues as well as the tumult in Ukraine, it has also lost its leverage over Iran. Regional powers from Saudi Arabia and Turkey to Qatar and the United Arab Emirates acted in their self-interest. Despite being in a regional power struggle with Iran and having close ties with Washington, Saudi Arabia struck a surprisingly balanced and diplomatic tone, perhaps accounting for recent overtures seeking to mend relations with Tehran. Qatar and Oman, longtime neutral parties in regional diplomacy, helped craft messages back and forth between Washington and Tehran and sought to position themselves as dependable go-betweens.
What the 2025 Iran–Israel war did, in the end, was to unmask how world powers address upstart regional crises. Although the United States continues to be the principal player in the security calculus of the Middle East, the presence of other powers, especially China and Russia, is an undeniable reality. This changing landscape could herald a multipolar era in global crisis management, with no one state exercising complete control over global dynamics.
The Future of the Islamic Republic after the Ceasefire
China Wheel: Description of the book the summer of 2025 sees Iran calling a halt to hostilities against Israel. China brokered the peace between the two countries, following sustained international persuasion. For the first time, the regime was presented with a direct threat of total war, which did not only aim at the military and nuclear infrastructure but also its very existence. The Islamic Republic survived the crisis temporarily, but with the question: What future awaits the Islamic Republic after suffering such a heavy blow?
The first long-term consequence of the war is the erosion of the Islamic Republic’s image of “deterrence.” For years, the regime projected strength through its missile arsenal and regional influence, crafting an image of invincibility. The first long-term impact of the war is undermining the Islamic Republic’s notion of “deterrence.” For years, the regime projected power through its missile stockpiles and regional sway, presenting an image of invincibility. But the recent war showed that enemies could penetrate inside Iran, blow up sensitive installations, and kill top commanders. That symbolic loss could have internal and external consequences: It could cause public opinion to turn against the military and intelligence apparatus, sapping the Islamic Republic of support and emboldening regional players to challenge Tehran.
Second, reconstructing damaged military and political structures will pose a major challenge. The deaths of many IRGC commanders, degradation of missile defense capabilities, and damage to nuclear facilities all demand internal reorganization and massive financial investment. However, reconstruction will not be easy, as Iran’s economy is already stretched by years of sanctions and structural crises. Such pressures will force at least some Iranian leaders to pursue de-escalation, but the hardliners are sure to resist.
There were no major protests at home during the war, but the social environment may have changed afterward. It is easy to imagine the younger generation growing increasingly conscious of the dysfunction that characterizes the regime and pressing for reforms if not for a fundamental departure from the existing order. Should these demands continue to go unmet, future protests could be greater and more radical than in the past.
Iran’s influence over the so-called “Axis of Resistance” may weaken regionally. Proxy groups such as Hezbollah or Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces may sense that when a large-scale war looms, Iran’s support has clear bounds and that Tehran values its self-preservation over regional solidarity. This might prompt a rethinking of loyalties among Iran’s allies.
In the end, the Islamic Republic has two choices ahead of it: It can learn from the current painful experiences, adopt a diplomatic, de-escalatory strategy, and engage in efforts to rebuild its lost legitimacy, or it can carry on with its policy of repression and ideological grandstanding, leading such crises to explode at a slightly later time. But the fact is, the future will not resemble the past. The ceasefire may have brought one war to a close. Still, it inaugurated a new era of reckoning for Iran that requires consideration of survival, legitimacy, and the state’s future.
